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This paper argues that the concept of intelligence is highly 
value-laden in ways that impact on the field of AI and debates 
about its risks and opportunities. This value-ladenness stems 
from the historical use of the concept of intelligence in the 
legitimation of dominance hierarchies. The paper first 
provides a brief overview of the history of this usage, looking 
at the role of intelligence in patriarchy, the logic of 
colonialism and scientific racism. It then highlights five ways 
in which this ideological legacy might be interacting with 
debates about AI and its risks and opportunities: 1) how some 
aspects of the AI debate perpetuate the fetishization of 
intelligence; 2) how the fetishization of intelligence impacts 
on diversity in the technology industry; 3) how certain hopes 
for AI perpetuate notions of technology and the mastery of 
nature; 4) how the association of intelligence with the 
professional class misdirects concerns about AI; and 5) how 
the equation of intelligence and dominance fosters fears of 
superintelligence. This paper therefore takes a first step in 
bringing together the literature on intelligence testing, 
eugenics and colonialism from a range of disciplines with 
that on the ethics and societal impact of AI. 
 Introduction   
While much attention in the literature on AI has been given 
to defining the concept of intelligence (Legg and Hutter 
2007), very little has been given to interrogating how this 
concept has been deployed in normative or political 
contexts. The aim of this paper is to begin to address this, 
asking not what intelligence is, but rather what the concept 
of intelligence has historically been used for. It focuses in 
particular on the use of the concept to establish and 
legitimate power hierarchies. It then asks how the legacy of 
this usage might be shaping debates about machine 
intelligence.  
 This paper is therefore an assessment of intelligence as a 
value-laden term — what is sometimes called in moral 
philosophy a ‘thick concept’, one that is “both evaluative 
and descriptive” (Kirchin 2013, 1). It is an attempt at 
disentangling the evaluative aspect and making it explicit, 
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so that we understand in full measure what we are doing in 
using this term (Baisini 2015, pt. 8.1.2); an act of 
‘consciousness-raising’ as Simon Blackburn puts it 
(Blackburn 2013), or what another tradition calls 
‘deconstructing’ — “exposing a concept as ideological or 
culturally constructed rather than as natural or a simple 
reflection of reality” (Collins 2000, 15).  
 In pursuing this goal, this short paper takes a first step in 
bringing together two broad bodies of literature: that on the 
history of intelligence testing, eugenics, scientific racism 
and colonialism with the burgeoning one on the ethics and 
societal impact of AI. It begins by briefly laying out relevant 
aspects of the value-laden usage of the concept of 
intelligence. It then explores five ways in which this might 
be influencing thought about AI, ranging from the impact on 
diversity in the technology sector, to the misdirection of 
discourse on the risks of AI towards the concerns of those 
traditionally at the top of the dominance hierarchy and away 
from those already marginalised. 
Intelligence as a Value-Laden Concept: An 
Overview 
The specific aspect of value-ladenness that I will explore in 
this paper concerns the use of intelligence (and related 
concepts) to justify social, political and economic 
hierarchies, both within and across societies. I will argue 
that the concept of intelligence has played a crucial role in 
what Patricia Hill Collins calls a “matrix of domination” that 
has historically preserved the power of a White, male elite. 
This matrix is formed by intersecting “structural, 
disciplinary, hegemonic, and interpersonal domains of 
power” (Collins 2000, 18). Concepts such as intelligence are 
deployed as part of the “hegemonic ideologies” of 
superiority and inferiority that legitimate other parts of the 
matrix (Collins 2000, 284), where by ‘hegemonic’, Collins 
means they are “seen as natural, normal, and inevitable” 
(Collins 2000, 5). 
 
 
 In briefly exploring the ideological usage of the concept 
of intelligence, I will sometimes refer to related concepts 
such as ‘mental ability’ or ‘faculty of reason’. To be related 
in the relevant sense, a concept must fulfil two criteria. First, 
it must refer to higher cognitive faculties. Second, it must 
refer (whether usually or in the relevant context) to a faculty 
that admits of degree. One of the crucial historic shifts in 
thinking about cognitive faculties was away from the idea 
of a faculty that all humans possess equally and wholly, at 
least at birth (such as ‘mind’) towards the idea of a faculty 
that some people possess more than others (Gonzalez 1979, 
45). Although the rise of the word ‘intelligence’ in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries is entwined with this 
shift, earlier writers at times used cognate terms in ways that 
also imply this gradation. 
The Origins of Intelligence as Ideology  
The association between mental faculties and a right to 
power is an ancient one. Famously, in the Republic, Plato 
proposed (through the mouth of Socrates) that the ideal ruler 
of the ideal state would be the ‘philosopher king’, he “who 
has the gift of a good memory, and is quick to learn, —
noble, gracious, the friend of truth” (Plato 2008, bk. VI, 
487a). This was a novel idea at the time, competing with 
ideas of democracy, monarchy, inherited aristocracy, 
tyranny and others. Yet only one generation later, his pupil 
Aristotle used gradations of mental aptitude to justify a 
sociopolitical hierarchy that covered both different groups 
of humans and the rest of the natural world. In the Politics, 
he argues “that some should rule and others be ruled is a 
thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of 
their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for 
rule” (Aristotle 1905, bk. 1, V). What marks out the rulers 
is possession of reason; while one who lacks it “is a slave by 
nature”. Those men who use their mind have this more than 
those who work with their bodies; men have it in general 
more than women; and humans more than other animals. In 
all cases, it is better for the lower sorts that they should be 
under the rule of a master (Aristotle 1905, bk. 1, V). 
 We therefore see, at the dawn of Western philosophy, an 
identification of mental aptitude with the privileged, male 
human, and an argument for his right, because of this 
aptitude, to dominate over other groups. It is noteworthy 
that, whereas Plato was recommending a radical new 
politics, Aristotle was effectively defending the power 
relations that were then the status quo. What he presents is, 
in Collins’ terms, a hegemonic ideology, one that naturalises 
and normalises these power relations, and does so based on 
claims about mental aptitude. 
 However, this view was far from predominant in the 
subsequent two thousand years. The enormous influence of 
Christianity even in its Platonised, Augustinian form, meant 
that other virtues, such as piety, were valued over mental 
aptitude. At the same time, sovereignty was justified more 
by divine or inherited right than by intellectual superiority. 
For a number of reasons, this began to change in Europe in 
the seventeenth century. Some of these reasons have to do 
with the rapid intellectual developments of this time, 
including the rise of the rationalist project, empiricism and 
modern science. But the most important developments were 
political.  
 The first part of this was the republican movement’s drive 
to replace principles of hereditary rule with, in Thomas 
Jefferson’s words, “a natural aristocracy” based on “virtue 
and talents” (Carson 2006, 11). The second was the need to 
provide a moral and intellectual justification for aggressive 
colonial expansion from Europe, with its associated 
conquest, pillage and enslavement (Adas 1989, 199). In this 
context, the argument offered by Aristotle, that some people 
because of their superior intellect were born to rule and 
others less gifted born to be ruled, was hard to resist. We 
therefore see in this period the construction of race “to create 
and maintain distinctions between different members of the 
Homo sapiens species that lend a suprahuman explanatory 
ground… to these hierarchies” (Weheliye 2014, 28). 
Foremost among the criteria of difference was mental ability 
(Carson 2006, 76).  
 The implications of placement on this hierarchy were of 
the utmost consequence: because those at the bottom of the 
ladder were deemed mentally inferior — in the words of 
Rudyard Kipling, “Half-devil and half-child” — they were 
judged unqualified to rule over themselves and their lands. 
It was therefore perfectly legitimate — even a duty, “the 
white man’s burden” as Kipling put it — to destroy their 
cultures and take their territories (Kipling 1899). According 
to the historian Michael Adas (here quoting the influential 
Victorian cleric and author Frederic Farrar) this perceived 
backwardness ‘explained and justified the decimation or (in 
the case of the Tasmanians) the utter extermination of 
“primitive peoples” who had not “added one iota to the 
knowledge, the arts, the sciences, the manufactures, the 
morals of the world”’ (Adas 1989, 204). 
 This association of hierarchies of mental aptitude with 
racism and colonialism is further entangled with a 
dichotomous conception of civilisation versus nature, and 
the role of technology in mediating that dichotomy. For 
colonial European powers, superior science and technology 
were not only the means for conquest, but part of its 
justification, as they demonstrated the superiority of their 
intellect and culture (Adas 1989, chap. 4). The very purpose 
of science and technology was domination over nature and 
its subjection to human needs (Leiss 1972). This in turn 
equated to cultural success: “human civilisation was 
virtually synonymous with the conquest of nature” (Thomas 
1984, 25). Inhabiting the opposite of this civilised state were 
those peoples deemed inferior in intellect and 
correspondingly pre-technological, and who were therefore 
savages. The mission civilisatrice of the Western powers 
was to use their superior wits and technology to tame this 
wild nature — both lands and people — and put it to 
productive use. The matrix of domination therefore 
 
deployed conceptions of intellectual rank to legitimate 
exploitation of both nature and those ‘races’ considered to 
be in a state of nature; while this very technological capacity 
to exploit was in turn part of the proof of intellectual 
superiority. 
 It is hard to find a European or North American thinker 
of the 18th and 19th centuries who, if opining on race, did 
not assert the intellectual superiority of White people (Gould 
1981, 32; Carson 2006, 88). The only real debate was 
whether this was cultural or biological. The idea that it was 
biological was politically more attractive: it implied that 
Whites were innately superior, and other races would not be 
able to challenge this superiority even if given access to 
similar cultural resources. However, the age of empiricism 
demanded numbers to support these claims (Gould 1981, 
74). Consequently, we see in this period the development of 
what is sometimes called racial science, or scientific racism. 
Although it is important to remember that this logic was 
applied not only to different races, but also to gender and 
class. We should therefore think of it also as scientific 
sexism and classism, often operating in conjunction. 
 The first sustained attempt was in the form of craniometry 
— measuring the size of the skull. This was taken to be a 
proxy for mental ability and so was supposed to provide 
objective grounds for the well-established racial and social 
rankings. By the mid-nineteenth century, this enterprise had 
collapsed under the weight of the facts (Gould 1981, chap. 
3). Nonetheless, these efforts drove the ideological and 
scientific imperatives to coalesce and “make intelligence 
seem a singular, real, measurable, physical entity” (Carson 
2006, 78). The ground was therefore prepared for the first 
systematic attempt to directly measure intellectual ability — 
by the English scientist Sir Francis Galton. His best-known 
work was the 1869 book Hereditary Genius, in which he set 
out to demonstrate that mental ability was hereditary, and 
that it determined people’s success in life.  
 Galton was also the inventor of the term ‘eugenics’, “the 
science of improving stock… to give to the more suitable 
races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing 
speedily over the less suitable” (Galton 1883). He believed 
that the poor and marginalised were poor and marginalised 
because they were intellectually inferior. They should 
therefore for the good of ‘the race’ be discouraged from 
breeding. His work gave expression to the mood of the 
privileged classes in Britain and around the world (Levine 
2017, 12). The term eugenics became the name of a 
worldwide movement, with intelligence testing the primary 
tool for determining who was fit to pass on their genes and 
who was not. As historian Philippa Levine puts it: “nothing 
was more important for eugenicists than intelligence… 
intelligence was the key variable” (Levine 2017, 25). Until 
this time, the late nineteenth century, the word ‘intelligence’ 
had “remained largely in the backwaters of English-
language discourse” (Carson 2006, 79). When it began to 
rise to widespread usage, it was as part of the eugenicist 
ideologies of White supremacy, colonialism, classism and 
sexism. 
The Science and Politics of Intelligence in the 
Twentieth Century  
The first test to resemble modern IQ tests (in being a battery 
of diverse short activities designed to quickly assess 
different aspects of reasoning) was developed by the French 
psychologist Alfred Binet in 1905. It created the notion of 
‘mental’ age in order to determine which children were so 
behind that they should be given special education. But it 
was not designed for fine gradations or rankings. This 
changed when the test made it across the Atlantic and was 
picked up by a group of influential American psychologists 
who were also active members of the eugenics movement. 
Through their efforts, within two decades the idea of a 
hierarchical, unilinear intelligence “had become a term of 
central importance within American psychology and, to a 
certain degree, American culture” (Carson 2006, 159).  
 A landmark in this development was the publication in 
1916 by Stanford psychologist Lewis Terman of a revised 
and expanded version of Binet’s test. Known as the 
Stanford-Binet, its updated version is still in use today. 
Thereafter, intelligence became associated with IQ (a term 
coined by German psychologist William Stern and 
developed by Terman), “understood as innate, quantifiable 
mental ability” (Carson 2006, 183). Like others in this 
group, Terman was deeply sexist, classist and racist, and 
believed that the tests would demonstrate that the 
established order, in which White, educated men formed the 
elite, was right and just. He concluded from his studies “that 
the whole question of racial differences in mental traits will 
have to be taken up anew and by experimental methods. The 
writer predicts that when this is done there will be 
discovered enormously significant racial differences in 
general intelligence” (Terman 1916, 92). He became a 
leading member of the American Eugenic Organization, 
anxious that those he deemed inferior “constitute a grave 
problem because of their unusually prolific breeding.” 
 Another member of this group was Carl Brigham at 
Princeton, who created the first SAT (which originally stood 
for Scholastic Aptitude Test) to test pupils for college-
readiness. He was one of the psychologists involved in the 
group’s great coup: the administration of IQ tests to US 
Army recruits during World War I. Over the course of the 
war, 1.75 million people were tested. Brigham used this data 
to write his highly influential 1923 book A Study of 
American Intelligence. He concluded: “It is also possible to 
make a picture of the elements now entering into American 
intelligence. At one extreme we have the distribution of the 
Nordic race group. At the other extreme we have the 
American negro. Between the Nordic and the negro, but 
closer to the negro than to the Nordic, we find the Alpine 
and Mediterranean types” (Brigham 1923, 196). When he 
developed the SAT, it was not to ensure all peoples, 
 
regardless of race or gender, had an equal chance of college 
entry, but to ensure that the Ivy League Universities 
remained predominantly White in the light of increasing 
immigration.  
 Later in life, Brigham recanted, admitting his entire 
analysis of inherited racial difference was baseless (Gould 
1981, 232–33). But by then his work had contributed to the 
rise of the eugenics movement, to the perpetuation of racial 
segregation, and to much stricter immigration laws — which 
for example severely curtailed the number of eastern and 
central European Jews who were accepted into the US just 
as Nazism was gaining its hold. As Nazi Germany took 
racial science and eugenics to new extremes, it 
correspondingly fell out of favour in the mainstream in the 
US and UK. But this ideology did not go away, and has 
resurged periodically throughout the post war period, for 
example, in the controversy around the 1994 book The Bell 
Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life 
(Herrnstein and Murray 1994). The association between 
intellectual superiority, right to rule, and the White male 
continues to be perpetuated explicitly in right-wing circles 
today (Saini 2019). 
 The history of the science of intelligence is therefore the 
history of “the abstraction of intelligence as a single entity, 
its location within the brain, its quantification as one number 
for each individual, and the use of these numbers to rank 
people in a single series of worthiness, invariably to find that 
oppressed and disadvantaged groups—races, classes, or 
sexes—are innately inferior and deserve their status” (Gould 
1981, 25). Of course, the historic use of the concept of 
intelligence by some to further a particular ideology does 
not impugn the entire psychometric enterprise. I am not in 
this paper taking a stance one way or another on the complex 
and contested science of general intelligence. But I hope to 
have made the case that, regardless of the validity of the 
science, intelligence is a highly value-laden term that has 
been implicated in a matrix of domination since its rapid rise 
to widespread usage just over a century ago.  
Implications of the Value-Ladenness of 
Intelligence for AI Ethics 
In the remainder of this paper, I will suggest some ways in 
which this value-laden legacy of intelligence might be 
interacting with both the development of AI and the debate 
around its associated risks and opportunities. I will note five 
lines of enquiry (there are surely many more): 1) how some 
aspects of the AI debate perpetuate the fetishization of 
intelligence; 2) how the fetishization of intelligence impacts 
on diversity in the technology industry; 3) how certain hopes 
for AI perpetuate notions of technology and the mastery of 
nature; 4) how the association of intelligence with the 
professional class misdirects concerns about AI; and 5) how 
the equation of intelligence and dominance fosters fears of 
superintelligence. 
 My assumption in making these links is that the long, 
value-laden history of the concept of intelligence, with its 
associated biases, continues to inform beliefs today. As 
noted above, in some circles, racialized and gendered ideas 
of an intelligence hierarchy are explicitly propounded (Saini 
2019). Pertinent to AI, it is worth noting that the 
racialisation of intelligence has historically been particularly 
stark in the US, home of Silicon Valley, “because of the 
centrality of race in American culture” (Carson 2006, 4). But 
even where such claims are not made explicitly, implicit 
bias is widespread (Doris 2018). Such bias includes 
perceptions about innate intelligence: associations between 
different racial groups and different degrees of intelligence 
have been found in groups ranging from US college students 
to Dutch high school teachers (van den Bergh et al. 2010; 
Okeke et al. 2009; Amodio and Devine 2006). While the 
most egregious abuses might lie behind us, the concept of 
intelligence remains far from decolonised. 
1) Claims about AI, and the Fetishization of 
Intelligence 
The first point to note is that some of the debate around AI 
and its potential impact uncritically assumes the central 
importance of intelligence in the human story. For example, 
an influential 2014 newspaper article by Stephen Hawking, 
Max Tegmark, Stuart Russell, and Frank Wilczek argued 
that:  
The potential benefits [of AI] are huge, since 
everything that civilization has to offer is a product of 
human intelligence; we cannot predict what we might 
achieve when this intelligence is magnified by the tools 
AI may provide, but the eradication of disease and 
poverty are not unfathomable. 
 
 The article goes on to highlight the potential dangers, 
arguing “success in creating AI would be the biggest event 
in human history… [but] might also be the last, unless we 
learn how to avoid the risks” (Hawking et al. 2014). This 
claim that intelligence is the root of “everything that 
civilization has to offer” was repeated in an ‘open letter’ 
prepared by the Future of Life Institute, of which Max 
Tegmark is the director. That open letter has been signed by 
some 8,000 people, including many famous AI researchers 
and technologists, such as Demis Hassabis and Elon Musk 
(Tegmark 2015).  
 However, this claim for the primacy and centrality of 
intelligence is highly contentious. Indeed, at most points in 
the last two thousand years, it would very likely have been 
considered patently false. For example, in the eighteenth 
century, “industriousness and frugality” were considered 
paramount qualities (Gonzalez 1979, 51), while into the 
nineteenth, the range of talents considered central to 
civilisation were “multiple and diverse” (Carson 2006, 3), 
with as much emphasis on moral virtues as intellectual ones. 
Even Francis Galton believed that the triad of mental ability 
 
with zeal and hard work were the key to human 
achievement. Today, mainstream psychometricians do not 
argue that intelligence encompasses everything that matters 
in human society. Ian Deary writes in his introduction to the 
topic that intelligence tests “do not measure creativity or 
wisdom… personality, social adroitness, leadership, 
charisma, cool-headedness, altruism, or many other things 
that we value” (Deary 2001, 16). Unless we define 
‘intelligence’ so widely as to encompass all human talents, 
it therefore seems false to claim that “everything that 
civilization has to offer is a product of” it.  
 More importantly, in the light of the ideological baggage 
carried by the term, this fetishization of intelligence is 
potentially harmful, foregrounding as it does a quality 
historically associated with (and consistently deployed to 
benefit) one particular privileged demographic. Needless to 
say, the dominant voices in debates about the risks and 
opportunities of AI, such as the authors of the article above, 
have largely belonged to exactly that demographic. It is 
therefore unsurprising that the term intelligence has been 
uncritically promoted, and the extent to which it is part of a 
matrix of domination correspondingly obscured. 
2) The Fetishization of Intelligence, and Diversity 
in the Technology Sector 
This leads to the second point. The fetishization of 
intelligence (and related concepts such as brilliance or 
genius) impacts on some sectors more than others. A recent 
study in the US showed that practitioners in some 
disciplines, including computer science, emphasise the 
importance of ‘brilliance’ more than practitioners in other 
fields, such as psychology (Leslie et al. 2015). Those fields 
that emphasise the importance of pure brilliance over other 
attributes have fewer women and African Americans. The 
authors argue that this arises from the “pervasive cultural 
associations linking men but not women with raw 
intellectual talent” — associations whose history we 
explored in the last section. There are a number of 
mechanisms by which these associations might have impact: 
people in these fields might exhibit biases against women; 
women might themselves be vulnerable to stereotype threat; 
or women might simply decide that these fields are not for 
them. The authors demonstrate that these same arguments 
apply to African Americans.  
 While that study looks at computer science as an 
academic discipline, we have reason to think that the harm 
caused by the fetishization of intellectual brilliance extends 
to the commercial high-technology sector. The proportion 
of women doing technology-related jobs in the leading AI 
companies is notoriously low: ranging from just under one 
in three of tech-related employees at Netflix to one in five at 
Google and Microsoft, and even lower at Twitter and Uber 
(Richter 2019). At the same time, there is a strong myth of 
meritocracy in Silicon Valley as a community that values 
only the quality of the coding, not background, privilege or 
connections (Thompson 2019, chap. 6). However, as the 
study by Leslie et al mentioned above shows, when a 
community believes itself to value only intellectual 
brilliance, it becomes susceptible to bias in perceptions of 
what kind of person possesses such brilliance. A 2010 study, 
“The Paradox of Meritocracy in Organizations,” found that 
in cultures that espouse meritocracy, managers “show 
greater bias in favor of men over equally performing 
women.” The authors even suggest that “ironically, working 
in an environment that highlights meritocracy might make 
individuals believe that they are fair and objective, and as a 
result, make them more likely to display their biases” 
(Castilla and Benard 2010). 
 These studies show that although the more explicit uses 
of the concept of intelligence to establish dominance 
hierarchies are confined to the last century, the underlying 
ideology persists. Different groups are perceived to have 
different degrees of intelligence, and these perceptions 
determine their access to positions of influence, including in 
the field of AI. In response to a highly controversial 2017 
memo in which a Google employee argued that women are 
not as suited to coding as men because they were less 
systematic thinkers and more neurotic, Cynthia Lee, a 
lecturer in Computer Science at Stanford, described “the 
background of endless skepticism that every woman in tech 
faces” (Lee 2017). We can hypothesise that the current hype 
around AI, and well-publicised proclamations of the 
paramount importance of intelligence by senior members of 
the field, will perpetuate this cycle of exclusion. 
3) AI and the Mastery of Nature 
The remaining three points all relate to how the value-
ladenness of the concept of intelligence might be shaping — 
or distorting — perceptions of the impact of AI.  
 First, the opportunities. We can ask how the centuries-old 
association between intelligence, technology and the 
mastery of nature could be affecting perceptions of AI in this 
moment of environmental crisis. The open letter quoted 
above evidences this association in the claim that “we 
cannot predict what we might achieve when this intelligence 
is magnified by the tools AI may provide, but the eradication 
of disease and poverty are not unfathomable.” Eradicating 
disease and poverty are of course two of the main 
motivations for mastering nature, and both would require 
very substantial manipulation of our bodies and the natural 
world. Similarly, AI is sometimes portrayed as the answer 
to global warming: Demis Hassabis, founder of DeepMind, 
for example, has spoken of his goal to “solve intelligence, 
and then use that to solve everything else,'' including 
“climate change” and “energy” (Burton-Hill 2016). 
 But the presentation of AI as the solution to our problems 
ignores a large body of literature, going back at least to 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, that 
blames the will to technological mastery for our current 
environmental crisis (Horkheimer and Adorno 1972 
 
[1944]). Critics in this tradition would argue that the belief 
that we can simply build better tools to master an 
increasingly rebellious nature is symptomatic of the kind of 
thinking that caused the problem in the first place. Indeed, 
the reality is that AI is currently contributing to the climate 
crisis — one recent study showed that training a single 
neural network model produced 300,000 kilograms of 
carbon dioxide emissions (Strubell, Ganesh, and McCallum 
2019; quoted in Dobbe and Whittaker 2019). The notion that 
AI will further our mastery of nature and so permit us to 
engineer a solution to climate change could be seen as a 
palliative thought that undermines motivation for what 
really needs to be done, which is to change the attitudes and 
behaviours that underpin unbridled consumption (a 
challenge sometimes known as ‘moral hazard’, see The 
Royal Society 2009, sec. 4.3). While some argue that the 
goal of dominating nature is intrinsic to the technological 
project in general (Adas 1989), we can hypothesise that the 
close association of the concept of intelligence with this 
project means that a technology pitched as intelligent (‘AI’) 
will fuel this particular approach to the natural world. 
4) AI and the Threat to Middle Class Jobs 
Now to the fears. It is a common trope in discourse on the 
impact of AI that it will engender a new wave of automation 
which, unlike previous waves, will threaten middle class 
jobs. Martin Ford, for example, in his 2015 book Rise of the 
Robots: Technology and the Threat of Mass Unemployment 
has a chapter on ‘White-Collar Jobs at Risk’ and discusses 
the consequences of AI and related technologies for “many 
skilled professionals—including lawyers, journalists, scien-
tists, and pharmacists” (Ford 2015, xv).  
 Taking account of the value-laden history of intelligence 
can help us to understand these fears. If developments in 
computer technology are being portrayed as intelligent, and 
intelligence has long been considered the primary marker of 
the professional elite, then it is natural to conclude that these 
intelligent technologies will take their place in that elite, dis-
placing the incumbents. Hence concern is directed to the fate 
of those incumbents (e.g., ‘Will A.I. Put Lawyers Out of 
Business?’ Sahota 2019). I do not want to deny that such 
concerns could be partially legitimate; that “increasingly in-
telligent algorithms threaten higher-skill occupations” (Ford 
2015, 59). But we can ask whether the concern for the exist-
ing professional elite is proportionate. Much research shows 
that it is much more likely to be those who are already mar-
ginalised who will be most affected by AI and data-driven 
technologies (O’Neil 2016; Eubanks 2017; Noble 2018; 
Benjamin 2019). We should therefore be wary of attention 
given to the impact of AI on unemployed lawyers as op-
posed to “people of colour, migrants, unpopular religious 
groups, sexual minorities, the poor, and other oppressed and 
exploited populations” (Eubanks 2017, 6), who are not rated 
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highly by the ideology of intelligence, but will be most tar-
geted by intelligent machines.  
5) Superintelligence and the Dominance Hierarchy 
Fifth: from R.U.R., Karel Čapek’s 1921 play which 
launched the term ‘robot’, through 2001: A Space Odyssey 
to the inexhaustible Terminator film franchise, we in the 
West have long fantasised about intelligent machines rising 
up against us. When we reflect on how the idea of intelli-
gence has been used to legitimate dominance hierarchies 
since ancient Greece, and in particular in recent centuries, 
this fear becomes easier to understand. As we saw, Aristo-
tle’s argument, enthusiastically adapted for the logics of co-
lonialism and patriarchy and class privilege, was that the in-
tellectually superior are by nature masters, and the intellec-
tually inferior by nature slaves. With this ideology forming 
part of the Western cultural backdrop, it is understandable 
that we fear intelligent machines will enslave us. (Indeed, 
H.G. Wells makes this connection, with aliens instead of AI, 
in War of the Worlds (Wells 1898)).  
 This perspective also helps us to understand a phenome-
non identified by Kate Crawford: that “currently the loudest 
voices debating the potential dangers of superintelligence 
are affluent white men” (Crawford 2016). It is exactly this 
group whose privileged position has for centuries been jus-
tified by their claim to superior intelligence. They therefore 
have the most to lose by the appearance of new entities that 
claim to be even more intelligent. Indeed, one might say 
powerful AI would create for them a dilemma: either cede 
their privileged position to the super-smart machines, or ab-
rogate the ideology of intelligence on which their privilege 
is based. Others outside this elite, on the other hand, might 
be less concerned about such creations, as they are already 
being oppressed by those purporting to be superior beings. 
Conclusion 
At the outset, I argued that insufficient attention has been 
given by those thinking about AI to the extent to which the 
field’s foundational concept of intelligence is ‘thick’ or 
value-laden. Albeit briefly, I hope to have brought to the 
fore the central role that intelligence has historically played 
in the logics of colonialism, racism and patriarchy. Of 
course, other discourses have also been conscripted into 
these agendas (e.g., that of the civilised and the savage). But 
intelligence is notable both for having played such a central 
role in these matrices of domination and because its rise to 
widespread usage is so entangled with them. I do not make 
the quixotic suggestion that the term should therefore be 
abandoned. Rather, I hope to have shown that critical eval-
uation of the value-ladenness of intelligence can and should 
inform debates about the ethics and impact of AI1. 
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